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Abstract
Three major health crises in American history include the polio epidemic in the 1950s,
the Ebola crisis in 2014, and the coronavirus in 2020. Each of these viruses evolved under a
different President, from President Eisenhower to President Obama to President Trump. Each of
these presidents spoke to the people on their respective crisis, and here I examine speeches,
addresses, and social media posts in order to examine the rhetorical strategies that each President
utilized. Each of them had a similar goal in mind, to eradicate the disease and quell the public’s
fears. However, they all had advantages and disadvantages that helped or harmed their message.
While President Eisenhower faced issues of vaccine hesitancy, he also had his military reputation
on his side. His rhetorical strategies then reflected some of these advantages and disadvantages,
such as stressing a trust in American science, comparing the virus to a physical fight, and an
appeal to common sense. In comparison, President Obama’s rhetoric on the Ebola crisis
presented a few similarities to President Eisenhower’s, such as both calling for Congressional
action and outlining a clear governmental response plan. However, President Obama employed
different rhetorical strategies, such as that of appealing to American nationalism, highlighting
preventative measures, and describing personal anecdotes. This was due to the assets and barriers
that he faced, like the fact that he was in his second term but also had a heavy critical media
presence. Lastly, I analyze these same factors against President Trump’s rhetoric on the
coronavirus. Comparisons between President Trump’s themes and President Obama’s included a
further pressure to trust American scientists. However, rhetorical strategies that President Trump
applied were emphasizing American exceptionalism in all areas, especially the economy, as a red
herring to distract from the virus, blame shifting, and minimizing the overall effects of the
coronavirus. These strategies reflected the advantages and obstacles that he faced, the ability to
set the agenda, but also his public image contrasting with that of a pandemic.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
In December of 2019, a mysterious and infectious disease began spreading rapidly
through the population of Wuhan, China. Severe coughing and cold symptoms became
associated with the rare and novel sickness yet remained unknown to most Americans for months
to come. One day, however, every citizen would know it by a more colloquial name: the
coronavirus. Its development remains a mystery, shrouded in misinformation and possible
theories, such as its development by philanthropist Bill Gates, or the possibility of the virus as a
laboratory experiment/biological weapon.1 Americans' treatment and plan for a disease of this
nature then was tested in March of 2020, when the virus reached the United States. The
combined efforts of the CDC, WHO, and former President Trump were all challenged to try and
contain the virus before it became a countrywide pandemic. Unfortunately, policy changes were
insufficient to stop this health crisis, and it is clear the coronavirus will unlikely disappear
completely.
In this study, I analyze presidential rhetoric in times of health crises. I discuss how
presidents choose to identify and explain certain diseases to the general public, and how public
response to those characterizations can inform public policy moving forward. Crises that impact
public health can come to define a presidency in the public’s mind and presidents face two
challenges when they confront a public health emergency: persuading the public of the severity
and presenting sensible policy options. For example, prior to policy being passed on climate
change, the issue first needed to be framed as a true crisis that had real detrimental effects to
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American life. Disease outbreaks present unique obstacles in a president’s career, as some
diseases cannot be cured, the solution is rarely solvable through simple political means, and
experts in all types of fields are called upon.
Additionally, it also places a strong reliance on the people of the country to overcome.
Presidents cannot themselves pass policies to end the disease, but instead must give up power to
their constituents to unite and follow procedure, while trusting their government to put measures
in place that are necessary to reach a sensible policy equilibrium. The president’s emergency
powers only extend so far, and presidents are often finding themselves under attack for their
inefficiency or inability to completely fix the issue at hand. For these reasons, health crises place
a rare burden on the president. This study contributes to understanding how presidents can more
successfully frame health crises to better prepare the public for the event and hopefully prevent
health crises from spiraling out of control like the coronavirus pandemic.
Presidents, as rhetors, define and frame disease that deeply impacts how the media
reports it and in turn how the public reacts. According to presidential rhetoric scholar, David
Zarefsky, “Because of his prominent political position and his access to means of
communication, the president, by defining a situation, might be able to shape the context in
which events or proposals are viewed by the public.”2 In this study, I examine the difference
between three presidents who faced the challenge of pandemic policymaking and examine how
some choose to place other issues at the center of their approach to the pandemic. In what
follows, I analyze presidential rhetoric surrounding stay at home orders and vaccinations to

David Zarefsky, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition,” in Presidential Studies Quarterly, (Chicago, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 2004), 611.
2
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discover if there are certain aspects to a presidential speech that encourage action and develop
the unity the citizenry needs to combat health crises. I hope to show that, even in the face of
microscopic and deadly threats like the coronavirus, a president’s words can save lives, even if
marginally, when their approval ratings are low, and especially in a digital age.
The following chapter provides an introduction into the study of rhetoric and presidential
communication. Presidential rhetoric has evolved ever since the start of the presidency, due to
the increase in executive powers and the growth of modern technology. Examining this further,
my discussion will examine how the innovation of social media and technology affected
authoritative rhetoric. In chapter 3, I focus on explicating the methodology for the paper and its
justifications on the specific methods of research utilized in the analysis and the specific articles
of rhetoric that will be examined for each health crisis. I also highlight historical context relevant
to each crisis and influential points that impacted the health crisis. Additionally, I lay out how the
study utilizes inductive versus deductive methods, as well as how, because of the continuity of
the office, some presidents can be representative of the presidency more broadly. I also explain
why these case studies contribute to the understanding of the presidency, and why they are the
prime examples of presidential health crisis rhetoric.
In chapter 4 I analyze the health crisis and response facing former President Dwight
Eisenhower. Eisenhower served from 1953-1961, for two consecutive terms, and confronted
polio as a public health crisis in his first term of office. I examined multiple speeches and articles
presented by the President, such as his 1955 statement that stated the availability of the vaccine
and its distribution plan. I compared this with his 1960 announcement that urged the
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unvaccinated to consider the vaccine.3 Through these statements I identified common themes
that make up health crisis rhetoric. Examples include the president’s attempt to create a sense of
unity among the people and an insistence on trusting science. Most of Eisenhower’s rhetoric
appeared to the people through radio, which shaped both the strategies and the public reception
of the communication.
In chapter 5 I explore the health crisis facing President Obama when the Ebola virus
reemerged. I discuss different communications from Obama and highlight significant
commonalities between Eisenhower and Obama’s rhetoric surrounding the health crisis and I
identify specific discrepancies. I examined President Obama’s 2014 address to the people on the
Ebola crisis, as well as the press release made by the President while visiting the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention earlier that same year.4
In chapter 5, I examine President Trump’s response to the coronavirus crisis. For this
case study, I evaluated tweets and speeches from the former president. Although the introduction
of social media shifts the available means from the past, it still exemplifies a way in which the
president can speak to the people and constitutes a new medium for presidential communication.
I begin by analyzing the president’s address to the nation from the Oval Office given on March
11, 2020, just four days before official lockdown began and conclude with the Trump’s Farewell
Address on January 19th, 2021. I show similarities with previous presidential public health crisis
rhetoric and identify areas in which Trump’s rhetoric differed from previous administrations.

“Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Press release statement by the President supporting the drive for polio vaccinations” in
National Archives (Abilene, KS: Eisenhower Presidential Library, 1958).
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In the concluding chapter, I overview the importance of the research into genres that
define presidential health crisis rhetoric. I highlight the different parallels in public health crisis
rhetoric between Presidents Eisenhower, Obama, and Trump, while identifying relevant
developments in public health crisis rhetoric. I argue that themes of unity and the analogy of the
virus as a war are present in every analyzed president’s rhetoric and contribute to a better
understanding of this genre of presidential rhetoric.

10

Chapter 2 - Prior Research
While crisis rhetoric and presidential leadership has been the topic of widespread
research in the past, much of that work is focused on Cold War and foreign policy crisis rhetoric,
but little work has been done in the context of health crises until recently. This study attempts to
fill this gap by examining 3 major health crises that presidents have responded to, with varied
approaches by the commander in chief, from little acknowledgement to thorough and
sophisticated strategies. Additionally, the study is also relevant because the country still faces a
major pandemic that persisted despite two presidents’ concentrated efforts. Three types of
studies in particular are significant to this project, including work done on presidential rhetoric,
public policy, and public health or epidemiology literature.
To start, presidential rhetoric is defined as, “the study of presidential public persuasion as
it affects the ability of a President to exercise the powers of the office”5 and include “public
communication addressed to citizens or their representatives.”6 The study of presidential rhetoric
typically focuses on three basic issues: the nature of the rhetoric and how it functions in a
democratic society, the characteristics of the office and the people’s expectations for the rhetoric,
and lastly how the president transformed the office and managed the media.7 These
considerations shape many studies on presidential rhetoric, which identifies shared
characteristics based on specific genres, whether State of the Union addresses or Inaugurals.

Theodore Otto Windt Jr., “President Rhetoric: Definition of a Field of Study” in Presidential Studies Quarterly,
(Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, 1986), 103.
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6
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Other common cases of analysis may take into consideration the president’s intended audience,
or leadership style.8 Campbell and Jamieson argue that different forms of presidential speech,
such as eulogies or veto messages, share characteristics that define a genre. They argue that,
“‘generic exemplars have an internal consistency’ and contain elements that imply other
elements, and that the elements in a genre ‘exist in a reciprocal, dynamic relationship.’”9 The
genre establishes audience interpretations of what the discourse should encompass, and shapes
the public response to presidential communication. There are several case studies of presidential
rhetoric and their implications in health crisis, and I will summarize three of them here, which all
emphasize a different element of health crisis rhetoric that a president puts forth.
One frame of presidential rhetoric examines apocalyptic rhetoric, that spreads
misinformation and public distrust for government institutions when dealing with health crises,
or rhetoric that emphasizes, “a catastrophic end-point that is more or less outside the purview of
human agency.”10 A form of hyperbolic rhetoric, apocalyptic rhetoric is rhetoric that categorizes
the health problem as something that may lead to the end of the world, or of civilization. The
pervasive televisual culture in America allows Hollywood to magnify these elements and give
them national consciousness. During the Ebola crisis of 2014, apocalyptic rhetoric on media
sources such as Facebook and Twitter grew dramatically. Framing Ebola apocalyptically has the
potential to create greater fear in the public’s mind, and a renewed emphasis or interest on how

Campbell and Jamieson, “Presidents creating the presidency : deeds done in words”, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2008), 15.
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the United States treats public health crises.11 In one particular ironic twist, former President
Trump tweeted multiple times about Ebola and the government’s ability to solve the crisis. Even
though he was not a political candidate at the time, his rhetoric foreshadowed how the future
president would remark on social media about the coronavirus crisis. The megaphone of social
media allowed the president to magnify and spread the message quickly. Even though
apocalyptic speech is not common among the general public, it is available everywhere,
“mainstream media and Twitter users spread this information and grant it legitimacy through
further communication on the topic.”12 Twitter magnified the discussion surrounding the Ebola
health crisis, and users utilized the platform to engage in framing the Ebola virus as apocalyptic.
Even though Ebola only affected 4 people in all of the United States during that time, there was
misinformation surrounding the disease that forced the government and CDC to handle the
situation.13 This health crisis lays the foundation for the rhetoric that would develop from the
Covid-19 pandemic, and the platforms that would spread not only public, but presidential
rhetoric.
Studies that correspond to public health and epidemiology literature also go to highlight
presidential rhetoric in terms of health crises, and the effectiveness that this rhetoric may have on
a governing body. Hyperbolic rhetoric in dealing with health crises, such as during the Ebola
crisis in 2014, affects how trustworthy the public views their institutions and the public’s

Thomas Salek and Andrew Cole, “Donald Trump tweets the 2014 ebola outbreak: The infectious nature of
apocalyptic Counterpublic rhetoric and constitution of an exaggerated health crisis” in Communication Quarterly
(Milwaukee, WI: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2018), 21–40.
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response. Health crisis rhetoric, or the framing of a health crisis narrative by the citizenry, often
contains hyperbolic rhetoric. This hyperbolic rhetoric creates fear, and ultimately distrust in
governmental institutions. Glowacki and Taylor argue that language especially common among
the public during the time of the Ebola crisis was language that placed blame on governmental
institutions such as the CDC, even when the public turned to the CDC for more information
about the crisis.14 This research also concluded that if given more informative information sooner
in a health crisis, the CDC and White House would not have fostered such hyperbolic rhetoric.
However, the addition of social media also played into the hyperbolic nature, “Namely, social
media users were eager to express distrust and anger.”15 The platform in which people could
continuously spread the extreme rhetoric regarding the health crisis exacerbated its reach and
therefore the message, yet ultimately was quick to dissipate.
Recent scholarship on the topic of presidential health crisis rhetoric in particular
describes how the President of Indonesia, during the start of the COVID-19 pandemic,
attempted to develop a specific leadership style through his rhetoric by focusing on the
Aristotelian characteristics of egos, logos, and pathos.16 Campbell and Jamieson observe that,
“different systems of government generate different types of discourse.”17 The rhetoric of the
executive branch is then one of authority, in order to display to the public, the elements of
Aristotelian rhetoric such as ethos, logos, and pathos that goes into powerful decisions.
Elizabeth Glowacki and Mary Anne Taylor, “Health Hyperbolism: A Study in Health Crisis
Rhetoric” in Qualitative Health Research (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press 2020), 1954.
14

Elizabeth Glowacki and Mary Anne Taylor, “Health Hyperbolism: A Study in Health Crisis
Rhetoric”, 1956.
15
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Additionally, presidential rhetoric is characterized by identification, authority, and directive
rhetoric. Identification rhetoric includes the use of “our, we, us” in order to show compassion
and unity with the people. Authority is rhetoric designed to show the power of the president.18
Lastly, directive rhetoric is established by the way the president shapes and influences public
opinion. Combined with the president’s already established political powers and these typical
presidential strategies, the Aristotelian model displayed President Jokowi’s credibility, logic, and
empathy with his people. This form is significant because it utilized evidence of the COVID-19
pandemic era in particular, and was used by the president to describe the major public issues that
were experienced at the time. It explained how the employment of Aristotelian rhetoric grew
during this period, while presidential speech on public health, education, and economic policies
grew interchangeably.
Additionally, closer to home, there has been research conducted on how the American
President at the start of the coronavirus, President Trump, influenced the widespread
development of face coverings for the public, and how the science behind wearing a mask
became controversial. According to Neville-Shepard, Trump was able to utilize rhetoric to turn
mask wearing into a form of weakness and a restriction of freedom.19 Neville-Shepard also
argues that Trump created a type of “populist crisis rhetoric,” or rhetoric that “transforms one
crisis into another crisis that may benefit a populist leader.” Trump utilized this populist crisis
rhetoric by making masks a sign of anti-Trump support and moral superiority. Rather than focus
on the public health implications of mask wearing, the former president focused instead on
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turning the act into a symbol of allegiance to Trump and his party. Whereas Trump framed his
opponent President Biden as weak and un-masculine for wearing a mask, he was categorizing
himself, and his supporters or party, as the opposite. More research has been done on how
symbolic acts, such as wearing a mask, become inherently political especially during health
crises. Kenworth et al. describe how additional factors, such as public health institutions, gained
symbolism in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as masking. The authors argue that
organizations such as the CDC and WHO morphed into political objects with their prevalence in
media and association with political leaders, like President Trump, who voiced their opinions
about their reliability and overall trustworthiness.20 As a result, these institutions carried new
meanings of, “indecisiveness and inadequacy”, representing politicians and scientists conflicting
opinions in the early days of the spread.21
While there have been several studies of presidential rhetoric during health crises, few of
these compare strategies across presidencies and in different health crisis situations. In what
follows, I outline the methodology for conducing three case studies and then examine three
different responses to health emergencies and draw conclusions about their strategies in times of
crisis.

Nora Kenworthy, Adam D. Koon and Emily Mendenhall “On symbols and scripts: The politics of the
American COVID-19 response” in Global Public Health, (2021), 1424-1438.
20
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Chapter 3 - Methodology
In this paper, I conducted an inductive investigation into three case studies of presidential
rhetoric. I examined three different presidents throughout history who have responded and
remarked upon a potential serious health crisis that takes the country by storm, Eisenhower,
Obama, and Trump. I will then compare each to the President Trump’s response to the
coronavirus. By analyzing the speeches, reports, and tweets of these men I will identify and
describe themes and rhetorical strategies that appear throughout each one. Because presidential
genres build upon previous approaches to similar situations,22 the strategic choices made by
Eisenhower established expectations for the public and provide presidents such as Obama and
Trump with a range of options for responses in the crisis. President Eisenhower altered what the
public expected when it came to presidents discussing public health and became the framework
through which later presidents reacted in similar situations. Identifying themes across
administration can help to identify repeated strategies such as an emphasis on trust in science or
the need for a unified public response. Presidential genre studies not only identify continuity
between presidents over time, but they can also examine how changes in the context or
technology available to a president can shape their strategies. For example, the beginning of the
digital age and the development of social media technologies complicates a simple comparison
between leaders and will play a central role in the transformation of rhetorical strategy from
presidents Eisenhower to Trump.
The scope of the study consists of presidents from the 20th and 21st centuries, including
men such as Eisenhower, Obama, and Trump. Each president faced a public health crisis,

22

Campbell and Jamieson, “Presidents creating the presidency : deeds done in words”, 31.

17
ranging from diseases such as the Polio, Ebola, and Coronavirus. Each provided a plethora of
rhetorical artifacts, speaking to the public about their respective public health crises, with plenty
of examples of speeches and communication surrounding the pandemic. My analysis highlights
similarities between past health crises and the current one. For the study, I examined speeches,
tweets, letters, presidential announcements, and interviews that reached the public by searching
records and identifying the best examples of health crisis rhetoric from their time in office. The
breadth of the study will also present disease in the context of globalization, and how the health
crises the president dealt with expand beyond their home country, and commonly become a
worldwide issue if they did not begin as one. I limited the research done to the 20th century but
included presidents with a substantial resource of communications to study. Although the
century began with the increase in globalization during World War I, and President Wilson was
president when the Spanish Flu spread around the globe, Wilson’s denial of the pandemic creates
a limited amount of rhetoric available, and therefore did not present sufficient artifacts to analyze
the beginnings of presidential health crisis rhetoric. Additionally, in terms of the coronavirus
emanating from China and reaching every country through rapid globalization, the Trump’s
administration response was included to highlight differences between Trump and past
presidents and examine how the rise of social media reshaped crisis rhetoric. This will
encompass the negative rhetoric by Trump on the origin of the disease as coming from China and
the impact this rhetoric had on Asian Americans. As disease is a common enemy for every
corner of the globe, many influential leaders have commented on the best way to combat the
problem. This study examines how disease is presented in speech, and what rhetoric is
commonly associated with it. I also cover how successful this rhetoric was in leading to an end to
the health crisis, or the significant impact.
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Chapter 4 - President Eisenhower and Polio
President Dwight D. Eisenhower served for two consecutive terms from 1953-1961 and
was known for his military prowess in both World War I and World War II. Never before
serving in public office until his presidency, he was faced with challenges from the Cold War to
the fight for civil rights. However, one landmark of his presidency was the development of the
polio vaccine in 1955. Polio was one of the most terrifying diseases facing parents prior to 1955.
The effects that polio had on children included permanent paralysis or even death, sparking fear
in the hearts of many parents in the United States. The constant reminder of seeing others struck
down by the disease, such as former President Roosevelt himself, increased its prevalence in the
public view, and therefore always at the forefront, “they were a visible, painful reminder to
society of the enormous toll this disease took on young lives.”23 With increased hygiene
practices in place during the 20th century and the development of germ theory, children were
protected from several other common illnesses, but left them vulnerable to diseases like polio.
Without the proper immune response built up in infancy, as children aged, they remained
susceptible to the disease, therefore creating a perfect situation for an epidemic. What made this
epidemic different for President Eisenhower, and the public, were the victims. Earning the name
“infant paralysis,” the public’s response to polio was often one associated with intense fear, a
fear that Eisenhower would attempt to combat during his presidency. 24
For Eisenhower, there were many obstacles to overcome with polio that extended not just
to the debilitating disease itself. In the hearts and minds of the American people, there were
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several different barriers that prevented thousands from receiving the vaccine. Even though fear
of the disease itself was high, “the virus was second only to the atomic bomb as to what
Americans feared the most,” fear about the vaccine was no less visible among the public.25
Vaccine hesitancy has been around for decades, and did not begin with the polio vaccine, yet it
was just another case in which it once again became popularized. The reason behind vaccine
hesitancy varies, “vaccine hesitancy is individualized and depends on one’s exposure to various
social, political, and environmental influences.”26 President Eisenhower then was fixed with an
onerous task, to convince enough Americans to receive the vaccine, even when they may be just
as terrified of it as of polio. However, the President did manage to have a few advantages on his
side; not only was trust in U.S. science at an all-time high, “if you had to pick a moment as the
high point of respect for scientific discovery, it would have been then,”27 but also approval
ratings of President Eisenhower himself contributed to people’s willingness to listen. The
President boasted a strong 68% approval rating the same month he released his first speech to the
public regarding the polio vaccine, indicating that Americans, if hesitant to trust the science,
would at least put their faith in the President.28 President Eisenhower focused on overcoming
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these barriers through much of his rhetoric on polio, with the purpose to quell the public’s fear, a
factor that he knew could prevent polio’s eradication.
As Dr. Jonas Salk was running the last of his trials on the polio vaccination, President
Eisenhower made a statement to the public. In his statement on May 31, 1955, the President
alerted the media that there was a polio vaccine that was set to be released in the coming weeks.
The speech overviewed an urge for the public to trust the vaccine, and an ultimate distribution
plan.29 There are three main rhetorical strategies employed by the President in this statement to
the people that each attempt to break through the barrier of vaccine hesitancy, including a
thorough discussion on the science behind the vaccine, the comparison to the epidemic as a war
or battle, and an appeal to the people to follow distribution guidelines. Each of these strategies
helped to not only quell the public’s nerves regarding a new vaccine, but also acted as an order
from the President to stop a tragic disease. Additionally, these same strategies are evident in
President Eisenhower’s 1958 and 1960 statements, in which he urged everyone to receive the
vaccine now that there was plenty available for public use.30 These two speeches in particular
highlight the President’s encouragement in the vaccination and signify to the public its efficacy
through the three rhetorical strategies of trusting science, the epidemic as a battle, and an appeal
to common sense.
The first method employed in the 1955 speech is the in-depth report on why Americans
should believe in Salk’s vaccine. Within the first few words the President cited “a committee of
scientists”, including the Surgeon General of Public Health, who were working tirelessly to
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develop the vaccine. 31 The appeal to ethos was meant to reassure the citizenry in the vaccine in
order to encourage its overall use, first and foremost dispelling any questions in the vaccine, an
obstacle that could destroy any work done by those scientists. He followed this up with, “batches
of vaccine must pass the most careful tests that science can devise,” focusing the first paragraph
in his address solely on approving the vaccine and highlighting its reliability on top scientific
practices. 32 Employing language that emphasizes credibility, not only behind the vaccine, but the
scientists as well, relying on his advantage of the widespread U.S. scientific credibility, President
Eisenhower attempts to prove to the public that there should be no doubt when it comes to the
safety of the vaccination. Due to the nature of the polio virus and its primary attack on children,
the vaccine was priority for ages 5-9, meaning that terrified parents would have to vaccinate their
children with a new scientific experiment.33 Eisenhower knew that it would be difficult to
suggest parents utilize a novel vaccine on their children without fully understanding the longterm effects, which is why the appeal to ethos in that first paragraph is so blatant, “scientists have
been able to design testing techniques…which build in a greater factor of safety and additional
checks on the final product.” 34 Rather than shy away from the fact of its employment on
children, the President confronted it head on “but remember- we are dealing in this field with the
lives of our children and our grandchildren.” 35 This strategy is carried throughout, evident also
in his 1958 address, “I especially appeal to parents to take advantage of this great research”, once
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again placing parental fears at the forefront.36 The President discussed the public’s fears,
sympathized with them, yet stressed heavily a trust in the scientific process and the polio
vaccine, all within the first few sentences of his statement in 1955 to the people.
Even though the President and the country were in the middle of a pressing ideological
battle with the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower also referred to the polio epidemic as a war
in his 1955 address, “they have found these answers and another battle in the continuing fight
against polio has been won.” 37 By utilizing the rhetoric of comparing the epidemic to a war, the
President framed the disease as not only something that can be beaten, but also that the epidemic
itself can end. The finality of the end of war is similar to what President Eisenhower hoped the
vaccine will be for the end of polio, clear from his comparison of the two. President Eisenhower
was not the first to use a war metaphor, and there are three elements that Zarefsky associates
with this rhetorical strategy, “defined the objective and encouraged enlistment in the effort, it
identified the enemy against whom campaign was directed, and it dictated the choice of weapons
and tactics with which the struggle would be fought.”38 These elements speak to President
Eisenhower’s use of the metaphor as well, from defining the polio disease as a beatable fight, to
making it known as the clear enemy and the vaccine as the ultimate weapon. Known widely for
his military background, this comparison also served to play to the President’s advantages of his
reputation of winning in times of war, further reiterating that trust that Americans should have in
him. Later, in 1960, the President once again utilized the rhetoric of fighting to describe the
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epidemic, “polio has been dealt a pressing blow but it has not been destroyed.” 39 A similar frame
of war rhetoric by citing the vaccine and its institution in thousands of Americans as a “blow” to
polio once again constructed the disease as an opponent. This is further corroborated with the
chosen word of “destroyed” in order to describe what happens to enemies in battle, or in this case
the polio virus. This also encouraged the American people to act as they would in times of war,
helping the cause in any way they can. In this case, the duty is clear: get the vaccine. The rhetoric
of war employed by President Eisenhower in comparison to the fight against polio not only
framed it as something that can have a definitive end, but also that the American people have
agency in the fight. By instituting this frame, the President was playing to his strengths: his
military background, something the people had already established trust in.
The last rhetorical strategy of note throughout President Eisenhower’s speeches to the
people include an appeal to one’s civic duty in the form of listening to state and federal
guidelines. From the distribution plan, to suggested age groups, there are several different
moving parts that the President confronted in his 1955 address. However, to make sure that all
policies were followed to the best of the American people’s ability, the President stressed an
orderly state, “with the combined efforts of all, the Salk vaccine will be made available for our
children in a manner in keeping with our highest traditions of cooperative national action.”40 An
appeal to the nation’s cooperation at the end of his statement is indicative of the necessity to
provide the vaccine in an effective way, in order to foster the most efficient results. Without this
rhetoric, in the form of an urge to follow governmental rules for vaccine distribution, not only
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would the President have had a stressed American public on his hands, but also a chaotic way of
distributing the vaccine, resulting in more polio cases. This rhetoric is carried throughout his
speech, from the first time he explained the plan ahead, “I strongly endorse this recommendation
and call upon our people to adhere strictly to the age 5 to 9 priority during the months ahead.”41
The call to action framed the plan as a group effort and creates a reliance on every individual
citizen to do their part, and to complete their duty in compliance with the structure presented.
Five years later, the President continued this rhetoric, “not enough Americans have had the full
course of injections that are needed for the maximum protection,”42 emphasizing the pressure
that it is every citizen’s responsibility to receive their vaccination. In this instance the President
was utilizing his advantage of his high approval rating, relying on Americans’ trust and belief in
him to heed his words. The rhetoric of appealing to the common sense and obligation of
Americans to follow guidelines and get Salk’s vaccination is integral to President Eisenhower’s
rhetoric on the polio epidemic, visible throughout his 1955 and 1960 addresses.
Overall, President Eisenhower’s rhetoric surrounding the polio epidemic and the
development and distribution of the vaccine contain three strategies in common: an appeal to the
ethos of science, comparison of the epidemic to a physical fight, and a pressure to do one’s civic
duty. Even though the President knew he had to confront several obstacles, stemming from
vaccine hesitancy, he played to his strengths of a sterling reputation and the credibility of the
U.S. scientific process. Beginning with the President’s first statement to the people on the polio
vaccine in 1955, President Eisenhower cited several different reasons as to why the credibility of
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scientists such as Salk should be trusted, and why the vaccine is safe for all. This is a trend that
then appears in his 1958 statement, when he sympathized with the parents and their concerns
over the vaccine in order to confront their fears with the scientific facts. The metaphor then of
polio to a battle or fist fight ensured the audience that polio can possess finality, and that in order
to stop it, the epidemic required the same dedication resulting from a time of war. Lastly the
appeal to one’s civic duty in both the 1955 speech and the 1960 address left Americans with the
fact that by not receiving the vaccine they are failing to do their part in the effort. This rhetoric
employed by President Eisenhower strongly encouraged the public towards his goal: “a polioprotected nation.”43

43

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Press release statement by the President supporting the drive for polio vaccinations”.

27

Chapter 5 - President Obama and Ebola
While polio sparked fear in the hearts of many, the emergence of the Ebola virus in 1976
posed just as much a threat to public health. The first case of Ebola in the United States occurred
on September 30, 2014, in the middle of President Barack Obama’s second term. While polio
leads to death in 5-10% of cases, the fatality rate from Ebola is closer to 50%.44 Not only did
this create the need for a stronger quarantine and prevention response, but news about the few
cases spread quickly.45 President Obama then was faced with a difficult task, how to
communicate the spread of the disease without causing public panic. According to Agostino et.
Al, “In public health emergencies, such as the 2014 Ebola outbreak, it is an enormous challenge
to communicate uncertainty without igniting fear and undermining public trust in health
authorities.”46 Additionally, sensational media coverage would only increase public fear of the
virus and risk criticism of the government’s response. Compared to 1956, the media in 2014 was
drastically more far reaching in not only the amount of coverage, but the type of coverage,
particularly when it came to the President’s actions. President Obama’s response then had to be
carefully curated for the public and media view, an obstacle he would have to overcome on top
of the epidemic. Clearly, in the case of the 2014 outbreak, Obama faced significant barriers to
communicating the government response in a manner that reassured without frightening the
public.
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In this case study, I highlight two examples of President Obama’s response to the crisis,
his September 2014 press release while visiting the Centers for Disease control (CDC) and his
address to the people later that year in December at the National Institute of Health (NIH). The
strategies employed by President Obama in 2014 are similar to Eisenhower’s, but Obama also
developed new strategies to quell public fears. Facing an increasingly dangerous public health
crisis, Obama emphasized nationalistic pride, stressed preventative measures, and utilized
personal anecdotes that appeal to pathos. Each of these strategies was balanced to manage the
public’s fear, while providing reassurance and guidance for how to combat the outbreak.
In comparison to Eisenhower, Obama employed similar rhetorical strategies. First, both
focused on the government’s plan of attack. Eisenhower emphasized the distribution plan for the
vaccine, Obama described the plan if the virus were to appear in greater numbers on U.S. shores.
In his December remarks at the National Institute of Health (NIH), he stated, “we’re working to
help flight crews identify people who are sick, and more labs across our country now have the
capacity to quickly test for the virus.”47 Both Eisenhower and Obama outlined for every
American citizen the active steps the government was taking so Americans could place their trust
in the system. Second, both requested help from Congress. In Eisenhower’s case, it was for the
purchase of the vaccine, in Obama’s, for other preventative measures. Both presidents used their
voice and the communication infrastructure of the federal government to help pass legislature to
address the crisis, as well as showed trust in the democratic system that they would receive the
funding they needed to keep the public safe. Refusing to provide the funding in an area such as
this, when there is an imminent threat to the country, would have diminished the political
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reputation of members of Congress, something both Presidents used to their advantage by
remarking on it in the same address as their plan against the epidemic. Obama told the public,
“I’m calling on Congress to approve the funding that we’ve requested so that we can carry on
with all these critical efforts.”48 This was similar to President Eisenhower’s choice of call to
action as well, who said, “This legislation is now being considered by the appropriate
Committees of Congress and I urge its immediate adoption.”49 Overall, both Presidents followed
the same structure in their speeches, focusing on the public health crisis and their plan of attack
and requesting help from legislature that would guarantee these plans come to pass.
While President Eisenhower faced issues with vaccine hesitancy however, President
Obama confronted barriers of his own. Major news sources closely followed the White House’s
movements and emphasized the influx of cases in the U.S as a question of government efficacy.
As the Washington Post reported, “in the wake of acknowledged errors that led to infections of
two nurses in Dallas, the White House is now engulfed in a crisis that has resurrected questions
about the president’s governing style.”50 Obama had to overcome this intense focus on him and
the wide public visibility of the government’s actions due to the media. However, the president
did have a few advantages on his side. He was in his second term as President, and therefore had
no need to pursue re-election. Instead of worrying about earning support from his party, he could
take actions that he thought were necessary to end the crisis. Additionally, the Ebola virus was
extremely dangerous. According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, “despite the microscopic
scale of the US outbreak, the fear response throughout the country was extraordinary in its
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breadth and magnitude.”51 This increased the likelihood that the public would adhere to CDC
guidelines or governmental orders. Additionally, researchers reported that “confirmation that
Ebola infection had occurred in a US hospital immediately jolted all healthcare systems
nationwide into high alert mode.”52 President Obama faced a complex set of barriers and
advantages during the crisis. On the one hand, the severity of the virus drove media coverage and
scrutiny, but on the other, it was the media coverage that provided the president with an
opportunity to communicate government response.
President Obama used three strategies to manage this complex situation. First, the
president appealed to American nationalism. In one of the first paragraphs of his 2014 CDC
press release, the president stated, “we’re prepared to take leadership on this to provide the kinds
of capabilities that only America has, and to mobilize the world in ways that only America can
do,”53 a clear emphasis on the nation’s prestige. By describing America’s exceptional status, the
President encouraged trust in the nation’s response to Ebola, and that it surpassed any other
country, so no Americans should fear the disease. This attempted to discourage widespread
public fear, but also played on individuals’ faith in their country. The president employed this
strategy once again in his December 2014 address to the public at the NIH. “Part of American
leadership in the world,” he said, “one of the things that has always marked us as exceptional - is
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our leadership in science and our leadership in research.”54 The emphasis on America’s power
and leadership leveraged the public’s faith in America, arguing that nothing, especially not
Ebola, could harm the country. Not only did the use of American leadership emphasize the
nation’s exceptional role in the world, it also directed the audience to focus on how the country is
going one step further to help other nations. Obama’s emphasis on American exceptionalism
attempted to overcome individual fears by counteracting it with their strong nationalistic beliefs.
Second, the president emphasized preventative measures that would help contain the
spread of Ebola. While polio was already a widespread and well-known virus, Ebola had no
vaccine nor widespread comprehension of its characteristics. This meant that rather than stress a
final plan to rid the world of the disease, President Obama focused on stopping the virus before it
reached polio infection rates. For instance, he emphasized that “we’ve been taking the necessary
precautions, including working with countries in West Africa to increase screening at airports so
that someone with the virus doesn’t get on a plane for the United States.”55 Instead of tackling
the idea and placing the thought in Americans’ minds of what might happen if the virus did
develop into an outbreak in the United States, the president strategically chooses to spotlight how
the government was working to prevent that very possibility. A few months later in December,
he told the public that some of those steps from his September statement had already been
implemented. He told them that the government response “shows that, because we’ve stepped up
our efforts in recent months, we’re more prepared when it comes to protecting Americans here at
home.”56 The stress on preparation emphasized the necessity to continue following the

54

Barack Obama, “Remarks by the president on the Ebola outbreak”.

55

Barack Obama, “Remarks by the president on the Ebola outbreak” .

56

Barack Obama, “Remarks by the president on the Ebola outbreak” .

32
recommended steps, while also making it clear to the American people that the government is
actively taking a role in preventing an Ebola pandemic.
Lastly, the President included varying personal anecdotes by citizens on the frontlines of
the disease that appeal to pathos. Anecdotes are effective as public discourse because they
produce strong emotions and attempt to influence people to understand the personal impact of
the virus. The strategy of utilizing an anecdote is not a new one in political rhetoric, and instead
has been studied from President Bush to Hillary Clinton forming an arguments in a way that
links real life examples to policies.57 For example, Obama told people that “Nancy Writebol, is
from Charlotte, North Carolina. She’s a mom, grandma, wife, also a Christian missionary. Along
with her husband, she went to Liberia. She was doing God’s work- caring for Ebola patients.”58
The anecdote of Nancy Writebol, one of the few nurses who was infected with Ebola, appealed
to the public’s empathy, and emphasized the President’s motivation for stopping the spread of
disease. The story made it personal to the audience, and humanized Nancy Writebol. It combined
familial appeals with appeals to Christian audiences to magnify the impact of the anecdote. The
President also employed this strategy in his speech at the CDC, “in one account over the
weekend,” he said, “we read about the family in Liberia. The disease had already killed the
father. The mother was cradling a sick and listless five-year-old son.”59 The president described
the family, emphasized the effects of Ebola, and professed the need for a treatment and
prevention strategy. These elements combined into an appeal to empathy and care by
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personalized anecdotes about the virus and its impact. The humanization of the people behind the
cases showed the public the disastrous effects of the disease and helped Obama justify the steps
taken by his administration.
Overall, Obama utilized three rhetorical strategies in his rhetoric on the Ebola virus, an
emphasis on American exceptionalism, detailed response and prevention plans, and personal
anecdotes to highlight the impact of the virus. When compared with Eisenhower, President
Obama used different rhetorical devices, but handled the crisis similarly, with a plan of action
and request to Congress for funding and support. Each strategy helped Obama to communicate
the severity of the crisis, the necessity of tackling Ebola before it spreads into the U.S. at
unprecedented levels, and the human toll that inaction would bring. While the spread of the
Ebola virus was less extensive than polio, it remained an extremely dangerous public health
crisis that the president had to address to dispel rising public fears. However, Obama maximized
advantages at his disposal to maintain a calm American public, even when the fatality rate and
symptoms proved catastrophic. In the end, Obama successfully confronted the Ebola outbreak of
2014 as a dangerous and potentially cataclysmic virus even under the microscope of the public
eye, and his strategies carefully avoided magnifying public fears while communicating the
serious nature of the virus and describing the response of his administration.
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Chapter 6 - President Trump and Coronavirus
The most recent and pressing epidemic crisis, the emergence of a novel coronavirus,
quickly swept in and changed the way of life in almost every single country. Developing at the
end of 2019 in Wuhan, China, the COVID-19 virus spread to all areas of the globe. Unlike polio
or the Ebola virus, COVID-19 was both highly contagious and difficult to detect initially. The
end of 2019 and beginning of 2020 was also the start of President Donald Trump’s fourth year in
office and he needed to quickly address the crisis while also pursuing re-election in the fall of
that year. However, the scope and breadth of COVID-19 was unprecedented, and it was a novel
disease that few had experience with. Despite repeated warnings from the community about the
potential for a global pandemic, such as cautions from public figures such as Bill Gates and
President George W. Bush, the United States seemed unprepared for the crisis.60 The addition of
social media and the president’s communication on these platforms, such as Twitter and
Facebook, further serve as a defining factor in his presidency and his communications about the
pandemic.
In comparison to President Eisenhower and President Obama, the means of
communication were drastically different for President Trump, which served as both an
advantage and disadvantage to his response. The barriers that the President faced, such as an
extremely polarized electorate and alternative campaign strategies, lent no favors when it came
to attempts to end the disease, and ultimately the President’s response to the coronavirus may
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have been one of the reasons he failed to win a second term.61 On the other hand, the President
also certainly had some advantages at his disposal with the introduction of social media. Not
only was President Trump able to reach a broad public almost whenever he wanted, but it
allowed his voters and followers with instant access to the President’s thoughts. The rhetorical
strategies that the President then utilized in his rhetoric on the disease, such as implementing red
herrings typically in the form of economic prosperity, blame shifting, and minimizing the effects
of the virus, all attempted to uphold his public image as an authoritative and law and order
president.62
Although social media platforms were present during President Obama’s years in office,
they had never been utilized to the extent that they were under President Trump. From Twitter to
Facebook, the President took to online platforms to portray his thoughts to the American people,
in an unregulated, honest, and crude way. However, this meant that the president often did not
have the luxury of closely monitoring all of his communication with the people, often leading to
various media outlets confronting Trump about his comments that were not official White House
statements to the people.63 Although the president’s reliance on these social media platforms also
served as an advantage as well, as he could set the agenda, “President Trump’s use of Twitter
diverts attention from news that is politically harmful to him.”64 By directing the American
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public’s attention to whatever the President deemed fit via social media, the mainstream media
had to constantly adjust to what the President wished to discuss. Social media then served as
both an advantage and disadvantage when it came to President Trump’s term, in his ability to
portray his public perception as a president that spoke directly to the people, while also setting
the agenda towards topics that were beneficial to his campaign. However, the factor of a
president that had a direct line to communicate with the people also led to a seeming lack of
professionalism and occasional unregulated commentary. The most acute barrier this creates is a
disjunct between the president’s statements and the opinion and expertise of the health
community. As seen in the case study of Eisenhower, a close alliance between health experts and
the White House is essential to successful messaging during a health crisis.
On top of this, the president was also faced with the dichotomy of his authoritative,
masculine public image and the nature of disease. While President Trump ran on a campaign of
law and order, there is no way to patrol disease, and a pandemic did not play to the president’s
strengths of enforcing public policy or economic deregulation. Instead, everyone, including the
president, could not fight the virus head on and instead had to quarantine and use regulatory
measures that were not so tangible in the public’s eye. Disease is also often associated with
weakness and sickness, something that does not bode well in a president’s campaign, particularly
when he was the oldest President in the nation’s history. Therefore, instead of playing into the
president’s campaign and public image, the coronavirus did the opposite and instead highlighted
the weaknesses in Trump’s ability to control the country or stop a non-material enemy.
In comparison to the Presidents who came before him who also dealt with public health
crises, President Trump often stressed several of the same factors in his rhetoric. Focusing on
American exceptionalism throughout his presidency, it was no different when it came to the
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novel coronavirus. As he told the public in his farewell address, “when our nation was hit with
the terrible pandemic, we produced not one, but two vaccines with record-breaking speed.”65 He
also urged certain groups of Americans to be more cautious as they are more susceptible, “the
highest risk is for elderly population with underlying health conditions,” similar to President
Eisenhower’s designation of 5-9 year old the most susceptible, “the vaccine be administered to
children of the ages of 5 to 9, inclusive.”66 Identifying the groups that would be effected most
from the disease raised awareness for the public to focus on protecting those groups. Lastly, the
president stressed a trust in American science, “we have the best economy, the most advanced
healthcare, and the most talented doctors, scientists, and researchers anywhere in the world,”
echoing President Obama’s words on Ebola, “should any cases appear in the United States, we
have world class facilities and professionals ready to respond.”67 Although President Trump’s
rhetoric differed in other ways, there were several strategic similarities that the President carried
on from his predecessors when it came to speaking on disease.
Throughout President Trump’s COVID-19 rhetoric, primarily in his address to the nation
on March 11, 2020, and various tweets sent from his personal Twitter account between the
months of March 2020 to December 2020, there were several instances in which the president
attempted to distract from the pandemic by discussing economic prosperity. In sentences in
which President Trump would remark on the virus, it would quickly be followed up by
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mentioning the strength of the American economy. For example, in March 2020 he said,
“because of the economic policies that we have put into place over the last three years, we have
the greatest economy anywhere in the world, by far.”68 This followed from the President asking
Congress for legislative relief for the coronavirus, changing the discussion from the pandemic to
one of his stronger points. His Twitter was an even more prevalent place for these red herrings,
“Coronavirus deaths are way down. Mortality rate is one of the lowest in the world. Our
economy is roaring back and will NOT be shut down.”69 The association with COVID-19 deaths
is quickly followed up with remarks on the economy, in attempts to distract from the real
problem and shift the conversation towards President Trump’s economic success. He continued
to use this strategy all the way until his Farewell Address at the beginning of 2021, stating that
“401(k)s are at a level they’ve never been at before. We’ve never seen numbers like we’ve seen,
and that’s before the pandemic and after the pandemic.”70 Quickly mentioning the pandemic and
then switching the course of the conversation to the economy, the President attempted to distract
from his potential mishaps with the handling of the virus and instead bring up one of his more
successful areas. The issue when it came to President Trump’s rhetorical strategy with these red
herrings included how these red herrings often distract the audience from the issue at hand, and
lead to not addressing the original problem. Within a democracy, when the president does not
respond to pressing concerns from the public this could potentially make the public feel as
though they could not trust the president’s response. In the context of the pandemic, the red
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herring made strategic sense as the President had, “built an enduring brand with conservative
voters, in particular, who continue to see him as a successful businessman and tough
negotiator.”71 However, it left many with unanswered questions as to the President’s efforts on
the pandemic, a difficult obstacle to control come election time.
The second rhetorical strategy that President Trump instituted throughout his statements
to the people included shifting the blame when mentioning the virus. Frequently mentioning
China as the cause for the virus and associating claims about the virus with China or other
countries asserts the blame on that individual nation, a strategy that the President often utilized.
“I always treated the Chinese Virus very seriously,” he stated one week into the lockdown, “and
have done a very good job from the beginning, including my very early decision to close the
‘borders’ from China.”72 Framing it as the “Chinese Virus” rather than the coronavirus or
COVID-19, the President reiterated the belief in people’s minds that China was to blame for the
health crisis, not United States health measures or government response. As the pandemic
heightened, the rhetoric from the President went further in shifting the blame directly to China
for the coronavirus, “All over the world the Coronavirus, a very bad ‘gift’ from China, marches
on.”73 Naming the coronavirus a “gift” from China further goes to show who the President
believes holds culpability for its presence in the United States, in order to deflect possible
commentary on the United States’ prevention measures or plan in handling the pandemic.
Additionally, there is correlative evidence between the presidents’ framing of the virus and a rise
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in anti-Asian hate around the country.74 Later in 2020 President Trump also commented on the
media and the coverage of the coronavirus. On several occasions the President blamed the media
for their representation of COVID cases, frequently employing the term “fake news” in attempts
to downplay the coronavirus and the number of cases. “Why does the Lamestream Fake News
Media REFUSE to say that China Virus deaths are down 39%,” he tweeted. This represents a
relevant example of how not only the President was placing blame on China, but also on the
media, in terms of how the United States was handling the coronavirus. As 2020 was also an
election year, this strategy could potentially deflect some of the President’s downfalls in the
response to the virus onto another, hopefully saving his chance for re-election, further
emphasizing how social media could have been an advantage in his Presidency.
The final rhetorical tool that President Trump exercised was attempting to minimize the
effect of the virus. In July of 2020, many states began reversing their guidelines to similar ones
that had been implemented at the beginning of the virus during the first shutdown.75 However,
that same month the President stated, “New China virus cases up (because of massive testing),
deaths are down, ‘low and steady,’”76 President Trump, in attempts to mitigate the public’s
negative perception of COVID, remarks on the coronavirus cases, and the reason behind the
spike in cases as the greater testing. This not only trivializes the number of cases, as if it is due to
massive testing and not any other factors as the President discusses, but also assures the public
that coronavirus deaths are down, even when that may not be the case with actual positive test
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results. The president’s statements did not reflect the data or science available at the time, and
thus led to mixed messaging and an uncertain public response. Even from the beginning of the
pandemic, President Trump decreed the risk of the virus as, “very, very low” in his March 11,
2020, address.77 This rhetorical strategy plays into the barriers that the President faced in his
handling of the coronavirus, as a President who ran with a campaign on masculinity and strength.
A show of strength and authoritativeness in a leader is typically helpful in times of war, when the
public looks up to a law-and-order President, however a pandemic is framed differently in the
public’s mind and therefore must be handled in a different way. Unfortunately for the President,
minimizing the effects of the virus, or downplaying the virus and the response, made it appear as
though President Trump had somewhat of a careless attitude towards it, and while he may have
been attempting to portray this careless attitude to protect his public persona, it also hurt his
approval rating.78 Unlike Obama and Eisenhower, who closely aligned their messaging with the
best available scientific and health information, President Trump’s willingness to use Twitter as
a means of communicating information to the public increased his access to the people during a
time of crisis, but left many citizens misinformed, confused, or worse.
In conclusion the strategies developed by President Trump during the coronavirus
pandemic differed drastically in some ways to previous presidents but also maintained the norm
when it came to American exceptionalism and trust in scientists. However, there was also a
newer form of communication that President Trump was able to utilize far more than any
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president before him, social media, which served as both an aid to the President’s image and
simultaneously may have hurt him. The three strategies align with those of implementing red
herrings, blame shifting, and mitigation of the disease’s spread. Although these strategies may
have attempted to decrease fear and anxiety in the public, they also led to a conflicted public
when it came to whether the President was responding appropriately.79 In the end, the barriers
that the President faced with coronavirus and the rhetoric he employed helps to further define
public health crisis rhetoric, primarily that a new method of communication allowed for
immediate real-time communication with the public.
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion
The rhetorical strategies exemplified by President Eisenhower, President Obama, and
President Trump all reflect presidential public health crisis rhetoric. In this study, I identified
common themes between all three, including trust in the American governmental and scientific
system, as well as strong statements on American exceptionalism. All three included some form
of this approach, as well as the underlying theme of asking for Congressional support with the
crisis. By comparing each of these three scenarios and the rhetoric of each President that was
tasked with handling the crisis, I uncovered several different traits of presidential crisis rhetoric
when it came to disease, but also considering their differences as well. The methods in which
these men transmitted their message also had an impact on what the message was, and how it
was able to circulate, particularly when it came to the development of social media platforms.
Taking a closer look at speeches, addresses, and social media posts from these Presidents I
examined similarities while accounting for including barriers and advantages that may have
hindered or helped their message. These disadvantages came in the form of the type of crisis,
vaccine hesitancy, and the presence of the media. However, each president also had some
advantages on his side. Those included assistance in the form of approval rating, how far along
they were in into their presidency, and the ability to set the agenda. The numerous barriers were
met with equal advantages that each President had on their side, something that required them to
change their rhetoric to fit their strengths and overcome those challenges.
Recent scholarship, in particular the study of presidential rhetoric and apocalyptic
rhetoric, help to reveal why these certain strategies are included in the strategies for addressing
the crisis. Taking a closer look at speeches, addresses, and social media posts from these
Presidents I analyzed different rhetorical strategies they included and examined the research as to
the reason that rhetoric differed or fit into a certain category of speech. In prior research such as
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on epidemiology literature and the Indonesia’s president during COVID-19, I found background
information on how other countries leaders were handling the crisis and how diseases and
pandemics are described. The scope of the study then encompassed certain leaders in American
history who faced a public health crisis, and those who published ample communication about it,
beginning with one of the first epidemics in the United States that developed a vaccine and
ending with more recent case studies that are fresher in the public’s memory.
From President Eisenhower, a general who was thrust into the presidency but finished
with high approval ratings, to President Obama, who confronted a deadly virus at the end of his
second term, to President Trump, who’s handling of the response to the coronavirus may have
helped lose him re-election, are all prime examples of health crisis presidents. Their rhetoric on
the disease and on epidemics contain strategies used to establish public trust and maintain their
political reputation, each unique to the president themselves. The strategies analyzed in President
Eisenhower’s speeches on the Salk vaccine in 1955 and 1958 included how the President
discussed an appeal to ethos and scientific credibility, comparison of the epidemic to a battle,
and a push for citizens to complete their civic duty, all attempted to push the public toward
receiving the polio vaccination. In the case of President Obama, the strategies that he employed
differed somewhat due to Ebola’s nature versus that of a virus such as polio, in that it had never
reached U.S. shores in the same capacity. His rhetorical strategies included American
exceptionalism, focusing on preventative measures, and using personal anecdotes to construct
narratives. By employing these, Obama attempted to prevent a true crisis that could significantly
affect a large population very quickly and quell the public’s fears when it came to that
possibility. Lastly, I analyzed President Trump’s rhetoric on the coronavirus, particularly his
farewell address and tweets between January 2020-December 2020. I analyzed strategies that
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included employing red herrings, blame shifting, and minimizing the effects of the virus. The
President practiced these to help his public image and downplay the widespread and long-term
effects of the pandemic.
Overall, each of these three presidents were faced with difficult tasks of quelling the
public’s fears and handling a health crisis. Their rhetoric portrayed their goals in stopping the
crisis, while also displaying strategies that they thought would aid them in obtaining that goal.
This research is especially important because of the past few years and the development of the
coronavirus. Not only does this research show possible failings of past presidents and why to
avoid them, but it also emphasizes what works to reassure and inform the public about the nature
of the crisis. In the future, research done on similar topics and that completes more of a direct
comparison between all presidents who served during health crises could be beneficial to further
noting presidential rhetorical strategies when it comes to these types of events.
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